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Urban Transport Policies and the Environment: Evidence from Italy 
 
Summary 
The paper reviews urban transport policies in Italian cities and their impact on the 
concentration of NO2 and PM10. Using parametric and non-parametric techniques, it 
finds no significant effect of the policy actions currently implemented. Further, it finds 
evidence of a weak positive impact of plans adoption. These results are interpreted as 
evidence of positive externalities among actions. Finally, by also discussing case 
studies, the paper points out the absence of economic instruments and argues that 
significant welfare gains would derive from their adoption. 
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In recent years, sustainable development has become a building block of economic 
policy at local, national and international level. The urban environment is currently high 
on policy makers’ agendas both because of its importance in determining the quality of 
life in cities (Blomquist et al., 1988) and because of the central role played by urban 
governments in shaping environmental policies (Nijkamp and Pepping, 1998). In this 
context, the sustainability of transport activities is one of the main objectives pursued by 
the European Commission to improve environmental quality in the European Union.  
In the past decade, freight transport volumes and passengers have grown by 34% and 
30% respectively. However, during the same period, greenhouse gas emissions have 
grown by 24%, whilst particulate matter has diminished by 30-40% (EEA, 2006). 
Despite this evidence of a relative de-coupling between transport growth and 
environmental quality, urban environment is still a source of concern for policy makers. 
This concern is driven by the fact that in the past decade, both NO2 and PM10 have 
shown an increasing trend in concentration levels and, more disappointingly, annual 
average observations show that the concentrations of those substances are well above 
the European limits. In particular, in 2003, NO2 and PM10 had an average concentration 
in the European cities of 57 µg/m
3 and 42 µg/m
3 respectively, while the limit will be set 
in 2010 at 40 µg/m
3 (EEA, 2006). 
In order to deal with the risks deriving from the high level of pollution in the cities, the 
European Commission has funded several projects aimed at studying and managing the 
transport/environment link (EC, 2001a; 2001b). One of the main goals of these projects 
is to identify best practices and appropriate policies to enhance sustainable   3
transportation. However, different policies vary enormously in their effectiveness in 
achieving a reduction of pollution, and the time spans of the effects differ as well. In 
this regard, the Transportation Research Board (1997) has considered several actions to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, stressing that: 
•  aggressive demand management and land use planning strategies will 
result in a 6% reduction by 2020, 15% by 2040; 
•  a 1.5% annual increase in average new vehicle fuel efficiency will 
generate a 15–20%  reduction by 2020, 35% by 2040; 
•  a 20% reduction by 2020 and 40% by 2040 will derive from higher fuel 
prices on the assumption of a 3% increase per year; 
•  the introduction of new low-emission vehicles (5% of the fleet by 2020, 
35% by 2040) will not induce any significant change by 2020, but a 30% 
reduction by 2040. 
The concern over sustainable transport is greater in the case of Italy, where the high 
density of population and economic activity makes transport market failures and the 
need for public interventions even more important. As recently reported by APAT 
(2006), between 1993 and 2005, the quality of the environment in Italian cities 
dramatically deteriorated in terms of PM10 and NO2 concentrations. Because of 
transport intensity, both pollutant matters constantly exceed the limit for almost three 
quarters of Italian cities with more than 150,000 inhabitants.  From an economic point 
of view, the costs associated with transport externalities amounted, in 1999, to 48,948 
million euros (table 1), almost 5% of the total GDP. More than one third of this amount 
was due to greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric pollution.   4
In recent years, a number of interventions have been undertaken by local governments. 
However, all these policy actions have been of the “command-and-control” type, whose 
economic efficiency is highly questionable (Fisher, 2000; Percoco, 2001). 
This paper reviews urban transport policies in Italian cities and points out their failures 
in terms of pollution control. It argues that the lack of economic instruments has 
resulted in poor performance by current public policies. It stresses that substantial 
improvement is required in parking policies and road pricing schemes, as well as in the 
use of incentives for public transport. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly introduces the main 
policy instruments and plans used in Italian cities to manage traffic. The effectiveness of 





2.  Policies for sustainable transport in the cities of Italy 
 
The economic literature has convincingly demonstrated that efficient transport pricing 
results in the internalization of external costs. In accordance with these findings, urban 
governments have introduced various economic instruments for traffic control. Among 
them, the most widely used are fuel taxes (Harrington and McConnell, 2003; Parry et 
al., 2006), car taxes (Fullerton and West, 2002) and, in some cases, road pricing 
(Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2006),
1  
                                                           
1 In recent years, however, tradable permits have begun to be considered in the case of transport as well, 
besides that of greenhouse gas emissions (Raux, 2004; Verhoef et al., 1997).   5
In Italy, fuel and car property taxes are set at central level,
2 so that they cannot be 
properly treated as urban transport policy instruments because of their lack of spatial 
variability (Rietveld, 2001).
3 Given this legal constraint/, urban governments have long 
addressed transport issues by means of infrastructure and public transport planning. 
However, in the past two decades, transport policy in Italian cities has consisted mainly 
in imposing standards and land use regulation measures, such as the definition of 
limited access or pedestrian areas, and in some sporadic cases, the construction of 
bicycle lanes (especially in Northern cities). Since the 1990s, and because of the 
increasing concern over environmental quality, urban governments have continued to 
rely on parking policies and traffic-free Saturdays or Sundays.  
As regards parking, parking charges are very common in almost all cities, both because 
of their effectiveness (Feitelson and Rotem, 2004; Rietveld, 2006) and because of their 
positive effect on municipal budgets.
4 On the other hand, traffic-free weekends, 
although very common, even in small cities, have recently been much criticized by 
environmentalists because of their supposed ineffectiveness. Although a comprehensive 
study on their effects is not yet available, Galeotti (2005) has recently proposed (as a 
rule-of-thumb estimate) a 10% reduction in the annual average concentration of 
pollutant emissions for 54 days of halted traffic, which indicates that traffic stoppages 
have only a modest effect on environmental quality.  
Besides specific parking plans, urban transport policy actions in Italian cities are largely 
considered in two types of urban plan: 
•  Piano Urbano del Traffico (henceforth PUT); 
                                                           
2 Regional governments can modify the tax on car ownership only within a very narrow range.  
3 The economic literature has not yet reached consensus on the overall impact of environmental 
federalism. For a good survey of the literature on this point see Millimet (2003).   6
•  Piano Urbano della Mobilità (henceforth PUM). 
The former type, PUT, is a classic urban transportation plan and is mainly devoted to 
managing city transport demand and supply issues, such as public transit, parking 
policies, and road safety measures. According to Italian law (Law Decree/D.Lgs. 
285/92), only cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants must define and adopt a PUT, 
whilst for smaller ones, the approval of a PUT is optional. In this regard, Isfort (2006) 
has estimated that almost 25.5% of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, or 
provincial capitals, do not yet have a PUT. As table 2 shows, the situation is 
comparatively worse in the South, whilst the North has a broader coverage of plans.
5 
 
[Tables 2, 3] 
 
The second type of plan, the PUM, is specifically designed to define sustainable 
transportation policies (Law/Legge 340/2000). A PUM may envisage a variety of 
actions, such as: 
a)  pollution and noise abatement measures; 
b)  road safety standards; 
c)  car-use reduction actions; 
d)  measures to encourage car pooling and car sharing; 
e)  actions to reduce congestion; 
f)  appointment of city mobility managers. 
In 2006, only 14 cities had adopted a PUM. They were: Ancona, Brindisi, Como, 
Cremona, Foggia, Grosseto, Lecce, Livorno, Macerata, Milano, Padova, Pescara, Prato, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 Note that in some cities, such as Bologna, Milan, and Rome, charged parking lots almost decupled 
between 2001 and 2003 (AIPARK, 2003).   7
Torino. In principle, the PUM may contain measures that can be considered as novelties 
for Italy, given that they are clearly economic instruments. However, as table 3 shows, 
the implementation of transport pricing measures is very limited, with the sole 
exception of Milan, where road pricing is at the very early stage of planning. In Padua, 
the newly-introduced transport pricing measure is simply the definition of new fares for 
public transport. 
In addition to PUM and PUT, several cities have adopted city and firm mobility 
management plans in in the past decade. These plans aim at rationalizing transport 
flows from home to workplace (or the university, in the case of students) and at 
providing incentives for sustainable transport modes (such as car sharing or pooling, 
biking, etc.). Table 4 reports the presence of mobility managers in a sample of cities 




In this case, too, the difference between Northern and Southern cities is evident.  
Thus far, I have briefly presented the instruments and plans used in Italian cities to 
manage transport. In the next section I address the issue of their effectiveness in terms 
of pollution control. 
 
3.  Some evidence on the effectiveness of transport policies 
 
3.1 Cross section estimates 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 See Appendix 1 for the geographical distribution of cities and regions.   8
The assessment of policy measures is particularly difficult in the case of urban 
transport, mainly because of the heterogeneity of interventions. From an economic 
viewpoint, Proost and van Dender (2001) address the issue in terms of the economic 
efficiency of different actions. Using numerical methods, they conclude that transport 
pricing policies yield substantial welfare gains.
6 In the same vein, Marshall and Banister 
(2000) have found that poor policy performance is often associated with poor planning 
in terms of a lack of clear objectives and strategy. 
The analysis reported in this paper took a different approach and estimated the 
following model: 
 
(1)  log(pollution) = constant + α∗Urban Policies&Plans + β∗socio-economic 
controls + e 
 
where pollution is the concentration of a given pollutant in the atmosphere (in our case, 
both PM10 and NO2 concentrations). Vectors α, β are vectors of parameters to be 
estimated. Urban policies and plans indicate specific instruments or plans adopted in a 
given city, whilst socio-economic controls denote a set of socio-economic variables 
respectively. Finally, e is an error term. 
The dataset assembled contained information on 80 provincial capitals for 2005
7. The 
following variables were considered for urban plans: PUT, which was a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the city had adopted a PUT; PUM, which indicated whether or 
not the city had adopted a PUM. As for policy variables, I used PEDES and LAA, 
indicating the percentage of pedestrian and limited access areas respectively on total 
                                                           
6 For a cost-effectiveness analysis of different economic instruments, see Fullerton and Gan (2005).    9
city area, while BROUTES was the length of bicycle lanes. Finally, PT indicated public 
transportation use in terms of passenger/km*vehicles, while MOBILITY indicated 
whether or not a city mobility manager had been appointed. 
As for control variables, I used value added per employee in the manufacturing sector 
(VA), the number of volunteers per 1,000 inhabitants (VOLUNTEERS) to indicate 
“civicness” and concern for public goods (Putnam, 1993), and the density of total 
population (DENSITY).  When data were available, I used 2000-2005 averages of 
explanatory variables in order to take possible time lag effects into account.
8 
I expected a negative coefficient in regression (1) for all policies and plans variables. As 
far as the control variables were concerned, I expected that VA and DENSITY would be 
positively correlated with the concentration of pollution, given that they wre meant to 
measure the intensity in the use of the urban territory. I also conceived VOLUNTEERS 
as a variable negatively correlated with the level of PM10 and NO2, because I assumed 
that the more people are concerned with social welfare, the more they are likely to 
behave in an environmentally friendly way.  
The reason for my inclusion of instruments and plans in the same regression was that, 
following Marshall and Banister (2000), I hypothesised that the adoption of a given plan 
stimulates synergies among measures. In other words, I presumed that the adoption of a 
PUT and/or a PUM had some sort of value added in terms of PM10 and NO2 
concentration. 
Table 5 reports the summary statistics for selected variables. Table 6  gives the results 
of OLS estimates on the determinants of NO2 concentration. As expected, pollution 
concentration is positively correlated with the (log) per capita value added, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Unfortunately, because of the lack of data panel estimation results were highly unsatisfying, even in the 
case of a small unbalanced panel.   10
with the size of the city as measured by the density of total population. Interestingly, the 
higher the social capital (as proxied by the number of volunteers), the lower the amount 
of pollution. In regard to urban transport policies, I found that the use of the public 
transit system, as well as the presence of a PUT in the city, had a positive impact on the 
level of NO2 concentration (i.e. the corresponding coefficients are negative). However, 
to be noted is that the estimated coefficient for PUT is never significant. 
As regards other policies – that is the presence of bicycle lanes, limited traffic and 
pedestrian areas – I found no significant effect on the concentration of NO2, which 
suggests that such policies are substantially ineffective. Finally, the last column in table 
6 checks for a possible beneficial effect of the presence of PUM. Neither in this case, 
despite the negative coefficient, is there a statistically significant effect. 
 
[Tables 5, 6, 7] 
 
Table 7 reports the results for the determinants of PM10 concentration, both as part of 
the empirical evidence and as sensitivity checks for the estimates obtained for NO2 
concentration. In general, all the results are confirmed, although the goodness of fit, as 
measured by the R-squared, of all models is always lower. 
At this point, it should be stated that results presented in tables 6 and 7 may be affected 
by a selection bias, because the adoption of a PUT or of a PUM may have been driven 
by a high concentration of pollutant matter in the city concerned.
9 In order to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Appendix 2 contains descriptions of the variables. 
9 In principle, the same bias may affect other policy variables as well. In order to avoid this problem, 
these are discarded in the following analysis. This choice is also prompted by the fact that they were 
found to have little explanatory power in terms of statistical significance.   11
problems of endogeneity, I used an instrumental variables approach. To this end, I 
defined the propensity score as: 
 
(2)     [] i i PUT PUM P Y Y 1 / Pr ) ( = =  
 
where Yi is the matrix of variables influencing the propensity of a city to adopt a PUM 
or a PUT.  The fitted value of equation (2), P ˆ , was then used to estimate the following 
equation 
 
(3)  log(pollution) = constant + α∗P ˆ  + β∗socio-economic controls + e 
 
In other words, I used a two step procedure in which, in the first step, (2) was estimated 
by means of a logit model, and in the second step, P ˆ  was used to estimate (3). 
As explanatory variables for the adoption of a PUT or a PUM, I used MOBILITY, the 
number of firms with ISO 14001 environmental certification (ISO) and an index that 
synthetically measured the diffusion of clean technology (ECOMGMT). In addition, I 
used two geographical dummy variables (CENTER and SOUTH). The results for the 
first step regressions are set out in the first two columns of table 8. All the variables 
have the expected sign and are statistically significant, with the sole exception of the 
dummies. 
Turning to the second stage regression, both PUT and PUM adoptions have a negative 
sign and, interestingly, the coefficient for the PUT is also significant.   
According to my econometric analysis, the instruments adopted by Italian 
municipalities have no effect in terms of pollution control, whilst the adoption of   12
transport plans seems to produce minor effects at most. This puzzling finding may be 
interpreted in the sense that “the sum of instruments” has no significant effect on NO2 
and PM10 concentration unless policies are coordinated by a plan. This shortcoming 
may be also due to the assumption of the linear form imposed by standard regression 
techniques. For this reason, in the next sub-section I report the use of a semi-parametric 
estimator that estimated the impact of policies independently of the functional form of 




3.2 Matching estimates 
 
As said, the results reported in the previous section may have been affected by two 
methodological problems. The first concerns the fact that the use of simple regression 
techniques entails the imposition of a linear relation between pollution concentration 
and its determinants. The second methodological issue is that some plans may contain 
specific measures that are not coded in the variables that I have selected. In this sub-
section I address the former issue, while in the following sub-section I discuss the latter. 
In order to relax the assumption of linearity as well as all other assumptions of 
parametric functional forms, I used a semi-parametric technique: that is, I used the 
matching estimator. In particular, I maintained the assumption of endogeneity of PUM 
and PUT adoption, or conditional independence as defined in the literature on the 
treatment effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).   13
As a first step I regressed PUT and PUM on a set of control variables like the ones 
reported in Table 8 (i.e. all explanatory variables for PUT/PUM adoption as well as the 
determinants of PM10/NO2 concentration). The estimation method was the standard 
logit. I next computed the propensity score as defined in (2) for every city in my 
sample. This fitted probability measures the likelihood of a city  receiving the treatment 
as defined by the adoption of a PUT or a PUM. As a final step, I estimated the effect of 
PUM/PUT adoption on pollution concentration by comparing the values of NO2 and 
PM10 for cities having adopted a plan or otherwise, but giving more weight to 
comparison of cities with similar propensity scores. Table 9 reports the estimated 
coefficients for three alternative weighting methods: 
a)  the stratification method, which divides the range of variation of the propensity 
score into intervals such that within each interval treated and control cities have 
similar propensity scores; 
b) the nearest neighbour with random draw method, in which the same 
stratification procedure as the one mentioned above is applied, but observations 
in blocks where controls are absent are dropped; 
c)  the nearest neighbour with equal weights method, which allows one to match 
treated units only with controls with nearest neighbours with a propensity score 
falling in a predefined range. 
The results confirm the positive impact of both types of plans, and they report higher 
significance values with respect to linear regression analysis. This may be due to the 
fact that the relationship between pollution and its determinants is not likely to be 
represented by simple linear regression. Note, in fact, that we do not need to make any 







The evidence reported in the previous sub-sections highlights the ineffectiveness of the 
instruments adopted to date by Italian municipalities, and it seems to show a weak, 
though promising, incidence of plans.  
Although reasonable, my econometric results may suffer from the fact that transport 
plans, such as PUM and PUT, in different cities may contain different urban transport 
policy measures. However, to corroborate my argument on the ineffectiveness of such 
policies due to the absence of market-based instruments, I considered the cases of four 
large cities: Milan, Naples, Rome, and Turin. 
The cities in question account for 1/170 of the total national surface, but they comprise 
10% of the Italian population (i.e. 5,750,738 inhabitants in 2001). Table 10 reports 
environmental quality and policy variables for the cities under scrutiny. All of them 
present above-limits concentrations of NO2, while PM10 does not seem to be 
problematic in the case of Naples. Interestingly, Milan has a much more widespread 
public transport system, although demand for it is relatively low, given that the 
utilisation factor (as defined by the ratio between passengers and km*vehicles) is 4.9, 
whilst it is 6.25 in Naples and 6.95 in Rome. As regards other policy variables, to be 
noted is that Milan, although its situation is worrying in terms of pollutants 
concentration, has very low indicators of pedestrian areas, limited access areas, and  
bicycle lanes length. Turin has the worst concentration of NO2 and PM10, although its 




All the cities have adopted a PUT and a parking plan, and they have appointed a city 
mobility manager (Table 11). Moreover, with the sole exception of Turin, price 
discounts on public transport for workers and students are available. Road pricing is 
under scrutiny only in Milan and Rome,
10 while car sharing or bicycle-use incentives 
are being considered only in Milan and Turin.  
As mentioned above, parking policies are very common in Italian cities. Table 12 shows 
that between 2001 and 2003, considerable increases in the number of parking lots 
occurred in the cities considered, with the sole exception of Turin, where the number of 
charged lots was already very high.  
To sum up, the previous tables seem to confirm the thesis that: 
a) the cities surveyed have adopted a broad set of (ineffective, given the 
concentration of pollutant matters) regulatory instruments, while transport 
pricing as an efficient solution to externalities is widely lacking; 
b) parking charges, although widespread, are considerably below the European 
average whilst there is no reason to believe that external costs are comparatively 
lower in Italian cities; 
c)  public transport has good growth potential, mainly driven by pricing policies, in 
addition to accessibility improvement. 
The items of evidence provided by the discussion of the above cases and by the 
econometric analysis confirm that the effectiveness of urban transport policies can be 
                                                           
10 On the application of road pricing schemes in Italy see Fiorio and Percoco (2007) and Ieromonachou et 
al. (2006).   16
improved by efficient pricing; and that, as they are at present, they perform poorly in 
terms of pollution abatement. In particular, the elasticities of the policy variables in 
tables 6 and 7 are not statistically different from zero, whilst the adoption of a given 
plan generates a reduction in the (log) concentration of NO2 and PM10 amounting to 
1.10-1.16 µg/m
3 (table 9). Note that, for the metropolitan area of London, Prud’homme 
and Bocarejo (2005) have estimated a reduction of 34-35% in total pollution after a 
congestion charge was introduced in the city center. As a benchmark result, if the same 
measure had been applied in Italian cities, and if we consider the average NO2 and PM10 
concentrations in table 10, reductions of 20.13 µg/m
3 and 15.07 µg/m
3 for NO2 and 
PM10 respectively would have occurred. 
But why have Italian municipalities not implemented more effective policies Perhaps, 
the main reason is the substantial lack of public support for economic policy measures, 
as in the case of a second-best tax. 
In 1999, the Eurobarometer conducted a survey to determine the opinions of Europeans 
on, amongst other things, the perceived effectiveness of various policies to solve 
environmental problems due to traffic in towns (EC, 1999). Figure 1 shows that the 
public acceptability of an hypothetical toll in Italy is very weak (12%) and well below 




4. Concluding remarks 
The quality of urban environment, and in particular the concentration of air pollution, is 
becoming a source of major concern for European policy makers. This paper has   17
considered the case of Italian cities, where levels of PM10 and NO2 are increasingly 
problematic.  
In regard to the determinants of pollutants concentration, the paper has attempted to 
evaluate, at least in terms of short run impacts, the effect of existing policy measures. 
Both parametric and non-parametric analyses, as well as a discussion of case studies, 
have shown that the measures adopted are largely ineffective in reducing pollution. 
However, the paper has also found a weak, though promising, effect of plans adoption, 
which suggests that effective value added derives from coordinated policy actions.  
My analysis has pointed out the ineffectiveness of non-economic instruments of local 
transport policy, and it claims that, in light of the experiences of other countries (such as 
the UK), substantial gains can be yielded by introducing measures which provide 
economic incentives to use public transport, as well as by efficient parking and road 
pricing.  
In recent years, a number of large cities, such as Bologna, Milan and Rome, have started 
to discuss or experiment with road pricing schemes. Local authorities are currently 
debating the desirability of such a policy, and they face the very well known problem of 
a lack of public support. The common and surprising feature shared by these cities is the 
fact that decisions or opinions on road pricing are not shaped by careful reviews of other 
cities’ experiences or by the estimated outcomes of integrated models, but only by 
political convenience. As a consequence, although some cities have adopted second-best 
instruments on the transport policy agenda, their implementation is highly problematic, 
and is not driven by any welfare analysis. 
A final word on social capital. My econometric analysis found that the higher the 
“civicness”, the lower the concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere. From a policy   18
perspective, this result should be interpreted as evidence for the crucial role of actions 
intended to increase public concern over environmental quality, and to reduce, through 
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Appendix 1 
Geographical repartition of regions and cities 
 
 
Northern regions: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino-Alto 
Adige, Fiuli Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna. 
 
Central regions: Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio. 
 





Northern cities: Alessandria, Aosta. Asti, Belluno, Bergamo, Biella, Bologna, Bolzano, 
Brescia, Como, Cremona, Cuneo, Ferrara, Forlì, Genova, Gorizia, La Spezia, Lecco, 
Lodi, Mantova, Milano, Modena, Novara, Padova, Parma, Pavia, Piacenza, Pordenone, 
Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Rimini, Rovigo, Savona, Sondrio, Torino, Trento, Treviso, 
Trieste, Udine, Varese, Venezia, Verbania, Vercelli, Verona, Vicenza. 
 
Central cities: Ancona, Arezzo, Firenze, Frosinone, Grosseto, Latina, Livorno, Lucca, 
Perugia, Pesaro, Pisa, Pistoia, Prato, Roma, Siena, Terni, Viterbo. 
 
Southern cities: Avellino, Bari, Benevento, Brindisi, Cagliari, Caltanissetta, Caserta, 
Catania, Lecce, Napoli, Nuoro, Palermo, Pescara, Potenza, Reggio Calabria, Salerno, 
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Appendix 2 
Description of variables 
Variable Description 
BROUTES  Cycle lanes (m/100 ab.; average 2000-2005; Source:  Istituto di 
Ricerca Ambiente Italia and Legambiente, Ecosistema Urbano) 
DENSITY  Population density (Source: Istat, Conti territoriali, average 2000-
2003) 
ECOMGMT  Synthetic index measuring environmental concern and measures in 
the city. For a thorough description, see Legambiente (2006). 
ISO  ISO Certification (N. of ISO 140001/1000 firms; Source: 
INFOCAMERE; data at provincial level) 
LAA  Limited access areas (sq.m/ab.; average 2000-2005; Source:  Istituto 
di Ricerca Ambiente Italia and Legambiente, Ecosistema Urbano) 
MOBILITY 
Presence of mobility managers (dummy variable. Mobility=1 if 
presence of firm or area mobility managers detected; Source: 
Bertuccio and Cafarelli, 2005) 
NO2  Average concentration (µg/mc); Source: Istituto di Ricerche 
Ambiente Italia and Legambiente, Ecosistema Urbano   
PEDES  Pedestrian area (sqm/ab.; average 2000-2005; Source:  Istituto di 
Ricerca Ambiente Italia and Legambiente, Ecosistema Urbano) 
PM10  Average concentration (µg/mc; Source: Istituto di Ricerche Ambiente 
Italia and Legambiente, Ecosistema Urbano)   
PT 
Public Transit Supply (km*vehicles/passengers; average over 2000-
2005; Source: Istituto di Ricerche Ambiente Italia and Legambiente, 
Ecosistema Urbano) 
PUT  Dummy variable indicating the presence of a PUT (PUT_Dum=1 it a 
PUT was approved before 2005) 
VA Value  Added  per employee (Source: il Sole 24 ore and Prometeia) 
VOLUNTEERS Number of volunteers per 1,000 inhabitants (data at provincial level 
for 2003; Source: Istat, Censimento del nonprofit) 







   23





Noise Accidents Congestion  Total 
Passenger 
transport 
2,231 9,196 4,841 10,109 8,136  34,514
Car 2,129  8,170  4,640  10,005  7,807  32,752 
Public 
transport 
102 1,027  201  104 329  1,763 
Freight 
transport 
555 7,967 1,704 742 3,465  14,434
Total   2,786  17,164 6,545 10,852 11,601  48,948





Table 2: PUT adoption in Italian regions (% of municipalities adopting a PUT; 2005) 





Emilia Romagna  62.5













Valle d’Aosta  100
Veneto 85.7
 
Italy   25.5
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Biking and car 
pooling/sharing 
incentives 






Ancona x    x     
Cremona x    x     
Milano x  x  x x x 
Padova x    x  x  x 
Prato x x x  x   
Pistoia x  x  x     
Torino x    x     





Table 4: Diffusion of mobility managers  
City   Number of firm mobility 
managers 
% of firms with 
mobility manager 
Bari   2   3.7  
Bologna   37   88  
Brescia   10   66.6  
Firenze   27   47.3  
Foggia   6   6  
Genova   25   75.7  
Milano   78   52  
Modena   9   64.2  
Napoli   9   9  
Padova   13   52  
Palermo   23   41.8  
Parma   23   100  
Roma   187   100  
Torino   41   58.5  
Trieste   9   60  
Verona   19   63.3  
Note: 
* indicates data at provincial level. City mobility managers have been appointed in all cities 
reported in the table. They are not considered in the second column. 








   25
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for selected variables 
    Mean   Median   Maximum   Minimum   Std. Dev. 
NO2 41.943  41.400  69.000  7.500  10.774 
PM10 37.426  36.000  59.000  15.900  9.563 
PT 3.273  2.357  7.427  0  6.390 
PEDES 0  0  4.660  0.000  0 
LAA 4.578  3.270  45.610  0.000  6.868 
BROUTES 7.502  4.560 32.010 0.000 7.725 
ISO 1.593  1.540  5.090  0  0 
ECOMGMT 63.959  63.000 100.000  0.000  23.841 
GAS 532.195  542.670  1.144.280  20.070  245.566 
VA 23,412  24,558  34,270  13,625  4,529 
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Table 6: Determinants of NO2 concentration (Dependent variable: log(NO2); OLS 
estimates) 
 Models 

















































LAA     0.040 
(0.278) 
  
PEDES     -0.021 
(0.716) 
  
BROUTES     -0.014 
(0.918) 
  




MOBILITY       -0.028 
(-0.358) 
        
R
2  0.57 0.59 0.62 0.58  0.61 
N.  Obs.  80 80 80 80  80 
       
Note: All variables are in logs, with the exception of PUT, PUM and MOBILITY. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Levels of significance: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1. A constant is always included, 
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Table 7: Determinants of PM10 concentration (Dependent variable: log(PM10); OLS 
estimates) 
 Models 


















(0.489)   
0.019 


















(-2.005)*   
-0.147 
(-2.167)** 





(-0.689)   
-0.253 
(-0.704) 
LAA     0.017 
(0.590)  
 
PEDES     0.019 
(0.444)  
 
BROUTES     0.014 
(0.333)  
 
PUM       0.111 
(1.500)   
-0.110 
(-1.490) 




          
R
2 0.36  0.44  0.44  0.46  0.47 
N. Obs.  80  80  80  80  80 
Note: All variables are in logs, with the exception of PUT, PUM and MOBILITY. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Levels of significance: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1. A constant is always included, 
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R
2 0.23  0.29  0.55  0.43 
N. Obs.  80  80  80  80 
Note: All variables are in logs, with the exception of Cond_PUT, Cond_PUM, CENTER, SOUTH. 
Models 1 and 2 are logit models, while models 3 and 4 are 2SLS estimates.  z- (models 1 and 2) or t- 
(models 3 and 4) statistics are in parentheses. Levels of significance: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1. 
R
2 for models 1 and 2 is a McFadden-R
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Table 9: Matching estimates 
 
PUT PUM  Propensity score 
matching method  NO2 PM10  NO2 PM10 
Nearest neighbour 
matching method 


































Table 10: Description of cities 
 NO2 PM10 PT Pedes ZTL BRoutes
Milan 54.90  52.50 4.90 0.09  0.15 1.83 
Naples 41.00  28.10  6.29  0.31 3.49 0.00 
Rome 63.90  39.90 6.95 0.14  2.44 1.55 




Table 11: Transport policies and plans in the cities 
  Milan Naples Rome Turin 
PUT  x x x  x 
PUM x       
Parking  plan  x x x  x 
City  mobility  manager  x x x  x 
Public transport cost incentives  x  x  x   
Road pricing planning or experimentation  x    x   
Bike and car sharing incentives  x      x 
Source: ISTAT, Isfort (2005), and our own elaboration.  
 
 
Table 12: Parking policies  
  Charged parking lots 
 2001  2003  %  var. 
Price index 
(EU average=100) 
Milan 3,030  31,225  931%  50 
Naples n.a. n.a. n.a.  112 
Rome 4,540  18,900  316%  40 
Turin 60,327  61,573  2%  86 
Source: AIPARK (2003) and our own calculations from websites. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents identifying tolls for city centers as effective means 

























Source: Eurobarometer 51.1 NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2007 
NRM 1.2007  Rinaldo Brau, Alessandro Lanza, and Francesco Pigliaru: How Fast are Small Tourism Countries Growing? 
The 1980-2003 Evidence 
PRCG 2.2007  C.V. Fiorio, M. Florio, S. Salini and P. Ferrari: Consumers’ Attitudes on Services of General Interest in the EU: 
Accessibility, Price and Quality 2000-2004 
PRCG 3.2007  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility 
IEM 4.2007  Chiara Longo, Matteo Manera, Anil Markandya and Elisa Scarpa: Evaluating the Empirical Performance of 
Alternative Econometric Models for Oil Price Forecasting 
PRCG 5.2007  Bernardo Bortolotti, William Megginson and Scott B. Smart: The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity 
Underwritings 
CCMP 6.2007  Valentina Bosetti and Massimo Tavoni: Uncertain R&D, Backstop Technology and GHGs Stabilization 
CCMP 7.2007  Robert Küster, Ingo Ellersdorfer, Ulrich Fahl (lxxxi): A CGE-Analysis of Energy Policies Considering Labor 
Market Imperfections and Technology Specifications 
CCMP 8.2007  Mònica Serrano (lxxxi): The Production and Consumption Accounting Principles as a Guideline for Designing 
Environmental Tax Policy 
CCMP 9.2007  Erwin L. Corong (lxxxi): Economic and Poverty Impacts of a Voluntary Carbon Reduction for a Small 
Liberalized Developing Economy: The Case of the Philippines 
CCMP 10.2007  Valentina Bosetti, Emanuele Massetti, and Massimo Tavoni: The WITCH Model. Structure, Baseline, Solutions 
SIEV 11.2007  Margherita Turvani, Aline Chiabai, Anna Alberini and Stefania Tonin: Public Policies for Contaminated Site 
Cleanup: The Opinions of the Italian Public 
CCMP 12.2007  M. Berrittella, A. Certa, M. Enea and P. Zito: An Analytic Hierarchy Process for The Evaluation of Transport 
Policies to Reduce Climate Change Impacts 
NRM 13.2007  Francesco Bosello, Barbara Buchner, Jacopo Crimi, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: The Kyoto 
Protocol and the Effect of Existing and Planned Measures in the Agricultural and Forestry Sector in the EU25 
NRM 14.2007  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: A Review of Recent Studies on Cost Effectiveness of 
GHG Mitigation Measures in the European Agro-Forestry Sector 
CCMP 15.2007  Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen, and Valentina Bosetti: Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize 
Climate 
ETA 16.2007  Erik Ansink and Arjan Ruijs: Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements 
ETA 17.2007  François Gusdorf and Stéphane Hallegatte: Compact or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and the 
Vulnerability to Transportation Shocks 
NRM 18.2007  Giovanni Bella: A Bug’s Life: Competition Among Species Towards the Environment 
IEM 19.2007  Valeria Termini and Laura Cavallo: “Spot, Bilateral and Futures Trading in Electricity Markets. Implications for 
Stability” 
ETA 20.2007  Stéphane Hallegatte and Michael Ghil: Endogenous Business Cycles and the Economic Response to Exogenous 
Shocks 
CTN 21.2007  Thierry Bréchet, François Gerard and Henry Tulkens: Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational 
Appraisal 
CCMP 22.2007  Claudia Kettner, Angela Köppl, Stefan P. Schleicher and Gregor Thenius: Stringency and Distribution  in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme –The 2005 Evidence 
NRM 23.2007  Hongyu Ding, Arjan Ruijs and Ekko C. van Ierland: Designing a Decision Support System for Marine Reserves 
Management: An Economic Analysis for the Dutch North Sea 
CCMP 24.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Roberto Zoboli: Economic Dynamics, Emission Trends and the EKC 
Hypothesis New Evidence Using NAMEA and Provincial Panel Data for Italy 
ETA 25.2007  Joan Canton: Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of 
Environmental Policies 
ETA 26.2007  Joan Canton: Environmental Taxation and International Eco-Industries 
CCMP 27.2007  Oscar Cacho and Leslie Lipper (lxxxii): Abatement and Transaction Costs of Carbon-Sink Projects Involving 
Smallholders 
CCMP 28.2007  A. Caparrós, E. Cerdá, P. Ovando and P. Campos  (lxxxii): Carbon Sequestration with Reforestations and 
Biodiversity-Scenic Values 
CCMP 29.2007  Georg E. Kindermann, Michael Obersteiner, Ewald Rametsteiner and Ian McCallcum (lxxxii): Predicting the 
Deforestation–Trend Under Different Carbon–Prices CCMP 30.2007  Raul Ponce-Hernandez (lxxxii): A Modelling Framework for Addressing the Synergies between Global 
Conventions through Land Use Changes: Carbon Sequestration, Biodiversity Conservation, Prevention of Land 
Degradation and Food Security in Agricultural and Forested Lands in Developing Countries 
ETA 31.2007  Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini: Are Workers’ Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional 
KTHC 32.2007  Giacomo Degli Antoni: Do Social Relations Affect Economic Welfare? A Microeconomic Empirical Analysis 
CCMP 33.2007  Reyer Gerlagh and Onno Kuik: Carbon Leakage with International Technology Spillovers 
CCMP 34.2007  Richard S.J. Tol: The Impact of a Carbon Tax on International Tourism 
CCMP 35.2007  Reyer Gerlagh, Snorre Kverndokk and Knut Einar Rosendahl: Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy; 
Interaction Between Environmental Taxes and Innovation Externalitie 
SIEV 36.2007  Anna Alberini and Alberto Longo: Valuing the Cultural Monuments of Armenia: Bayesian Updating of Prior 
Beliefs in Contingent Valuation 
CCMP 37.2007  Roeland Bracke, Tom Verbeke and Veerle Dejonckheere: What Distinguishes EMAS Participants? An 
Exploration of Company Characteristics 
CCMP 38.2007  E. Tzouvelekas, D. Vouvaki and A. Xepapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth and the Environment: A Case 
for Green Growth Accounting 
CCMP 39.2007  Klaus Keller, Louise I. Miltich, Alexander Robinson and Richard S.J. Tol: How Overconfident are Current
Projections of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions? 
CCMP 40.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti
 
and Roberto Zoboli: Environmental Efficiency, Emission Trends and Labour 
Productivity: Trade-Off or Joint Dynamics? Empirical Evidence Using NAMEA Panel Data 
PRCG 41.2007  Veronica Ronchi: Populism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Clientelism, Trade Union Organisation and 
Electoral Support in Mexico and Argentina in the ‘90s 
PRCG 42.2007  Veronica Ronchi: The Neoliberal Myth in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico and Argentina in the ‘90s 
CCMP 43.2007  David Anthoff, Cameron Hepburn  and Richard S.J. Tol: Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of 
Climate Change 
ETA 44.2007  Bouwe R. Dijkstra  and Dirk T.G. Rübbelke: Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy 
KTHC 45.2007  Benno Torgler: Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation Focusing on the United Nations
CCMP 46.2007  Enrica De Cian, Elisa Lanzi  and Roberto Roson: The Impact of Temperature Change on Energy Demand: A 
Dynamic Panel Analysis 
CCMP 47.2007  Edwin van der Werf: Production Functions for Climate Policy Modeling: An Empirical Analysis 
KTHC 48.2007  Francesco Lancia and Giovanni Prarolo: A Politico-Economic Model of Aging, Technology Adoption and 
Growth 
NRM 49.2007  Giulia Minoia: Gender Issue and Water Management in the Mediterranean Basin, Middle East and  North Africa
KTHC 50.2007  Susanna Mancinelli and Massimiliano Mazzanti: SME Performance, Innovation and Networking Evidence on 
Complementarities for a Local Economic System 
CCMP 51.2007  Kelly C. de Bruin, Rob B. Dellink
 and Richard S.J. Tol:  AD-DICE: An Implementation of Adaptation in the DICE
Mode 
NRM 52.2007  Frank van Kouwen, Carel Dieperink, Paul P. Schot and Martin J. Wassen: Interactive Problem Structuring with 
ICZM Stakeholders 
CCMP 53.2007  Valeria Costantini  and Francesco Crespi: Environmental Regulation and the Export Dynamics of Energy 
Technologies 
CCMP 54.2007  Barbara Buchner, Michela Catenacci and Alessandra Sgobbi: Governance and Environmental Policy 
Integration in Europe: What Can We learn from the EU Emission Trading Scheme? 
CCMP 55.2007  David Anthoff and Richard S.J. Tol: On International Equity Weights and National Decision Making on Climate 
Change 
CCMP 56.2007  Edwin van der Werf and Sonja Peterson: Modeling Linkages Between Climate Policy and Land Use: An 
Overview 
CCMP 57.2007  Fabien Prieur: The Environmental Kuznets Curve in a World of Irreversibility 
KTHC 58.2007  Roberto Antonietti and Giulio Cainelli: Production Outsourcing, Organizational Governance and Firm’s 
Technological Performance: Evidence from Italy 





















(lxxxi) This paper was presented at the EAERE-FEEM-VIU Summer School on "Computable General 
Equilibrium Modeling in Environmental and Resource Economics", held in Venice from June 25th to 
July 1st, 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of Conferences "European Summer School in 
Resource and Environmental Economics". 
(lxxxii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Climate Mitigation Measures in the Agro-Forestry 
Sector and Biodiversity Futures”, Trieste, 16-17 October 2006 and jointly organised by The Ecological 
and Environmental Economics - EEE Programme, The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical 
Physics - ICTP, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme - MAB, and The International Institute for 

















  2007 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 